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where trade unionism derives its identity from the now small manufacturing sector, TV audiences were 
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Creating 
A Monster 
AFSCME's Ready-to-Fight in Illinois 
• Abel Halpern 
Frequent media images of hundreds of county workers marching 
in front of public buildings in Rockford, Illinois, chanting confron-
tational slogans, rocked an otherwise sedate community. In an area 
where trade unionism derives its identity from the now small 
manufacturing sector, TV audiences were mesmerized by the sight 
of nursing home workers, court clerks, mechanics, jail guards, 
clericals, probation officers and tradesmen standing together, 
redefining the nature of unionism in Winnebago County. 
In October of 1990, Winnebago County AFSCME Local 473 
celebrated an unprecedented contract victory. The new agreement 
included a 23% wage-and-benefit increase in the first year. 
Workers received wage increases from 10% to 25%, a 60% reduc-
tion in the cost of dependent health coverage, longevity bonuses, 
parking allowances, uniform allowances, shift and weekend 
differentials, the elimination of a two-tiered benefits system, and 
a series of major language improvements, including the public 
sector equivalent of a union shop. Local 473's victory, however, 
lies less in their awesome monetary and contractual gains than 
• Abel Halpern was Illinois AFSCME's lead organizer during the READY TO FIGHT 
contract campaign at Local 473 of the American Federation of State, County & 
Municipal Employees in Winnebago County. He is now New England regional 
occupational health & safety coordinator for the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU). 
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in the program that led to the contract and the new kind of union-
ism that emerged. 
Seven months earlier, decertification and disintegration threat-
ened this very same local. It had been plagued by the typical inter-
nal problems faced by unions in America. The employer, the 
Winnebago County Board, retained an infamous Chicago-based law 
firm to exploit every opportunity to discredit and weaken the local. 
The workers themselves had internalized a ' 'what is the union going 
to do for me'' mentality. Workers thought of the union as a third 
party that had reneged on a "promise" to make their work lives 
more satisfying and lucrative. They believed that the union staff 
person "servicing" their 550-person bargaining unit bore the 
primary responsibility for every element of the union's operation. 
Through seven months of internal organizing and highly atypical 
contract negotiations, workers gradually abandoned these concep-
tions of unionism and internalized a new understanding of their 
individual duty to take responsibility for and invest themselves 
in the union. "Organizing" was now understood not as a peri-
pheral activity to maintain dues collection, but rather as the cen-
tral activity that guided every action, internal and external, of the 
union. Workers learned that contract negotiations did not take 
place only in a bargaining session involving a few officers, but 
also in the workplace, in the streets and in the community, 
involving as many people as possible. 
Pledging to Fight 
As 1990 began, the leadership of Illinois AFSCME Council 31, 
the state organization that oversees the local, was alarmed at Local 
473's inability to reverse its decline, especially as its contract 
expired at the end of September. The state leadership knew that 
traditional methods would not work with this troubled local, and 
decided to make a major investment in revitalizing the Winnebago 
County organization. 
In March 1990 Council 31 sent a full-time organizer along with 
the union staff representative to put together a plan to rebuild 
Local 473 and to win a new collective bargaining agreement from 
an extremely hostile employer. 
The five-year-old bargaining unit represented a diverse group 
including nursing home workers, highway employees, clericals, 
probation officers, correctional and juvenile detention officers, and 
court employees. Membership was at 20% and shrinking. Out of 
a bargaining unit of more than 500, only about 20 people had any 
substantive connection with the union. The few shop stewards 
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found themselves isolated and ineffective. The leadership of the 
local had little hope and found themselves at a loss as to how to 
keep the union from withering away 
For the majority of the work force the union did not exist. But 
a substantial minority were vocally anti-union and initiated a 
decertification effort which garnered much interest. The county 
government, recognizing the feebleness of the union, took every 
chance it had to discredit the local by either denying the most sim-
ple grievance or just ignoring the union altogether. The infamous 
anti-union law firm Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson 
directed the county's efforts. 
The union's rank-and-file elected leadership was accustomed 
to taking half measures, ignoring or not understanding the 
endemic problems of the organization. Many were reluctant to 
embark on a program that would endanger the "relationships" 
they had with managers and what they saw as their status as union 
leaders. The primary challenge was to get this group to accept the 
chilling reality that their union was all but gone. 
To save the local a radical program had to be implemented, 
taking substantial risks and, in effect, "raising the stakes." The 
first step in this process was planning. There were seven months 
until the contract expired. In past contract organizing efforts, the 
emphasis was on "signing up members," but there appeared to 
be little correlation between high membership and actual strength 
if people are joining the union for the "wrong" reason—that is, 
joining the union as if it were a service organization that could 
produce an improved worklife and a bigger paycheck without the 
commitment and involvement of the individual worker. The pro-
gram had to make people accept a personal responsibility for the 
union and to internalize the concept that this was in effect a battle 
with only two sides, management and worker. And, they had to 
be committed to a detailed plan for actually winning, not just 
surviving. 
The theme of the drive was READY TO FIGHT-CONTRACT 
90. In the first months of the campaign the goal was to "jump 
start" the union, creating momentum so the union could grow 
rapidly. In order to do this there had to be an effort to make sure 
that current members, and any new members, were in the union 
for the "right" reasons. Meetings were held with key individuals 
and groups throughout the county People were presented with 
a step-by-step plan for winning. The emphasis at these meetings 
was that the central element of a victory was the participation 
of workers. The AFSCME staff kept repeating that they as staff, 
could promise nothing. The degree to which people were willing 
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to sacrifice and fight would determine the outcome. The message 
was simple: 
"You are the union. You get what you are strong enough to get. 
Right now you are weak, so your contract is weak. If you are happy 
with a lousy contract, do nothing. If you want a better life and 
career, you are the one who has to act. The ONLY way to do that 
is to join with your co-workers and stick together. The county has 
declared war on YOU. So you had better fight back. Fighting 
means not only bringing your body to meetings, it means going 
after your co-workers and getting them to join us. It means argu-
ing. It means never giving up." 
Every member had to sign a READY TO FIGHT pledge and no 
worker could join the union unless they also signed the pledge. 
Conversely, no nonmember could sign a pledge. The text of the 
pledge read as follows: 
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The pledge had a number of purposes. This new militant and 
aggressive message had to be spread fast. The stress was on 
employees talking to and signing up other employees. Training 
sessions prepared people for talking with their co-workers, and 
the pledge gave them something to bring to their co-workers that 
was fresh and different. By being very strict about the conditions 
for membership and pledge-signing, a new sense of seriousness 
and urgency emerged. Pledge-signers received a black and blue 
READY TO FIGHT button, which they were told they had to wear. 
People saw the pledge campaign not as a "gimmick," but as a real 
effort by the union to take on the County Board. 
The pledge forced people to begin to commit to a new concep-
tion of what the union is. It also put management off guard. 
Workers wore READY TO FIGHT pins, and put pledge posters 
on their desks and stickers on their work vehicles. County mana-
gers became enraged as some departments were blanketed with 
READY TO FIGHT stickers, posters and pledges. 
In departments where there was negligible union presence, the 
organizers held lunches or simply hung around employee lunch 
and break areas. These numerous meetings would start as ' 'infor-
mational" sessions, but would end with each worker being asked 
individually, in front of everyone else, to commit to the program. 
The organizer demanded that each individual decide "which side 
they were on" right then and there. This was complemented by 
equally straightforward and aggressive mailings to those groups 
and individuals who would not be reached in the first sweeps of 
one-on-one organizing. 
By April, membership had doubled and a new, almost manic, 
mood had been created. Unprecedented numbers of workers 
began to turn out for meetings, as an extensive union organizing 
network began to emerge. The union was a major topic of con-
versation at every workplace in the county. Some anti-union 
people became increasingly belligerent as employees repeatedly 
approached them with pledges and invitations to lunches and 
meetings. But many anti-union workers decided to join the union. 
In a number of cases, entire groups of workers joined together. 
All the Adult Probation Officers and all the Building Inspectors, 
groups that had been anti-union, joined as groups and became cen-
tral players in the contract fight. 
The Monster Bargaining Committee 
The first stage was an overwhelming success. It succeeded 
because the union led by example, was aggressive and well orga-
\ 
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nized, and had a plan for winning. The union was not negative, 
nor were there "debates" about why the local had a substandard 
contract. The focus was on the future, not the past. 
But the focus on the future could not overcome lingering prob-
lems of trust, a conviction among many workers that in the past 
they were "sold out" by "back room deals." While many said they 
understood that the substandard wages and benefits came from 
the fact that the union was never very strong, not from anyone 
"selling them out," even the best had doubts. Words could not 
erase the lingering sentiments that were holding people back. 
There had to be a way to get people fully invested in the con-
tract fight. If people were only half-committed, they would find 
excuses to withdraw from the campaign as soon as it got hard. 
If members felt excluded from the bargaining process, they could 
not be expected to be active in supporting the union's demands. 
Traditional negotiations, conducted either by a small committee 
of representatives or by elected officers, would have played into 
the lingering fear of a "back room deal." The solution was to make 
the bargaining committee and organizing committee one and 
the same. 
Sometimes called "monster bargaining committees," taking large 
groups of members to the bargaining table was not a foreign con-
cept in Illinois AFSCME. The state workers' contract, for exam-
ple, is bargained in the presence and with the active involvement 
of more than 200 bargaining representatives from various units 
around the state. Local 473 decided to recruit a volunteer bargain-
ing committee of as many members as were willing to serve. 
Though voluntary, the committee was open only to those who 
met certain basic criteria. Each committee member had to com-
mit to seeing the process through to the end. By now it was early 
May, and this meant as many as two meetings a week through 
the fall. A concern was that bargaining would become a major 
activity that would remove the emphasis from organizing and 
talking with co-workers. To stress the importance of bringing 
negotiations back to the workplace, every prospective committee 
member had to have an official committee petition signed by four 
union members. Since the purpose was to make sure committee 
members were talking to people and not to limit the size, indivi-
duals were allowed to sign as many petitions as they liked. 
More than 100 members, approximately one fifth of the unit, 
eventually made the commitment to join the committee. The mess-
age to the workers was that they were the only ones who had 
a right to decide their future, so if they cared, they needed to be 
on the committee or in constant touch with someone who was. 
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Word spread through the county about the big committee. 
County government officials told workers that there would be no 
negotiations in a ''zoo" with so many people present. AFSCME 
staff pushed the committee not to buckle under. After all the incre-
dible momentum around the idea of workers deciding their own 
futures every step of the way, to back down would be defeat. At 
the first session in June, the county's anti-union lawyers handed 
the union ground rules that included a limit on the size of our 
committee and restrictions on our communications with the media 
and the general public. With 98 workers present, the union 
informed the county that there would be no negotiations on the 
size of the committee and no agreement to any ground rules that 
substantively impaired the union's ability to go to the media. 
The county was visibly upset with this forceful demonstration. 
Winning the fight over committee size and media access solidified 
committee members' commitment. They saw first-hand the 
arrogant million-dollar lawyers and the callous disrespect shown 
towards workers. They also saw that the plan for winning was 
real, that the union could stand fast and win. Workers were now 
fully invested in the fight. 
Committee members said they understood that no real move-
ment would occur until the very end, but it took a tremendous 
effort to keep people on the program of working with their 
co-workers, keeping them from getting frustrated and disgusted. 
People were instructed to bring the negotiations back to the 
worksites. After each bargaining session, we decided on a message 
that should be spread through the workplace. 
The Community Campaign 
By mid-summer the structures were in place, and the union 
was a solid majority and growing. The focus had to shift to the 
sharpening of a plan that would actually win a good contract. The 
workers had to show the county through job actions, rallies and 
other activities that they could strike. These demonstrations of 
strength had to come well before the deadline. In addition, there 
had to be a way to reach out to the community and media so that 
by the contract deadline the union could create a sense of crisis 
in this otherwise quiet area. As long as the issues were presented 
by the workers themselves as issues of right and wrong, justice 
and injustice, combined with fear of a tumultuous labor dispute, 
the union could garner media attention and public support. 
The union did not have the resources to send workers out to 
the community, as the organizing tasks were so great. Instead the 
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program relied heavily on direct mail, where three mailing lists 
proved particularly effective: a list of the families of residents of 
the county nursing home; a list of county government's vendors 
and creditors; and a list of every church and religious organization 
in the community. 
A sophisticated press strategy was integral to success. People 
getting a "raw deal" was not a "story," as countless cases of injus-
tice and exploitation exist everywhere and are not deemed news-
worthy. The stress was on developing interesting stories and 
"giving them" to the press. 
The union set an early deadline for a settlement, a month before 
the actual deadline. The reasoning was that "we had started a 
month early, let's finish a month early." We made up buttons and 
50 workers held a press conference where the slogan "FAIR AND 
DONE BY SEPTEMBER ONE" was unveiled. The union pledged 
to do whatever necessary to avoid a labor dispute, while providing 
the media information about impoverished county workers. Stories 
about county workers on Public Aid began to circulate in the press. 
This early start allowed the union to establish the terms of 
the debate, neutralizing the county's ability to use the "greedy 
workers" argument. TV and radio coverage resulted in an expec-
tation of an early settlement. When September came and there 
was no agreement, declarations were made raising the fear of an 
all-out strike. For the community and the county, the plan had 
succeeded in creating an atmosphere of crisis well before the 
actual deadline. 
Concurrently worksite organizing committees began to form. 
Their job was to organize and direct departmental job actions. Job 
actions varied, but the purpose was to demonstrate unity. Highway 
department employees, which had gone from 26% to 99% union, 
refused to cross an informational picket line at a quarry, causing 
a major dispute with management which included threats of 
firings. Courthouse employees spontaneously had a sick-in that 
was front-page headline news. 
Nursing Home employees and Correctional Officers each circu-
lated a petition, which 90% of the employees signed, decrying 
short staffing at the jail and in the nursing home. A press event 
where corrections officers in uniform stood side by side with 
nursing home employees was compelling enough for TV and radio 
to make it a major story. A week later the correctional officers' 
union organizing committee had 99% of all CO's refusing over-
time until they had a new contract. This also was a lead story on 
television and in the papers. These job actions, all organized by 
worker committees, showed the county, the media, and other 
An Organizing Model of Unionism 41 
. . .AFSCME Local 473's Bargaining Committee. 
workers that the union was serious and had the real capacity to 
plan and implement coordinated action. 
By mid-September the fight was in its final weeks. The press 
strategy became very aggressive as the union cultivated relation-
ships with reporters, giving them inside information and feeding 
them stories where workers were taking action. Newspapers, TV 
and radio regularly featured the union. Disc jockeys were discuss-
ing the plight of county workers on the air. With each successful 
job action and public demonstration, union members gained 
greater confidence in themselves and their union. The attention 
of the media and the growing public support reinforced their feel-
ings of empowerment. 
Organizing for the Final Push 
The bargaining committee, having maintained its enormous size, 
began to backslide in the organizing. People were giving up on 
the hard-core anti-union employees. The staff stressed the impor-
tance of "cracking every last nut," pushing every committee 
member to keep trying with even the most stubborn "hold outs." 
A group of workers began house visits to nonunion workers. While 
people were generally very nervous about house visits to hostile 
workers, these visits proved useful. 
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Ten days before the contract expired, the union conducted a 
strike vote. Voting was held at worksites to guarantee maximum 
participation. That evening at a rally of 250 county workers, half 
the bargaining unit, the union announced that 97% of the workers 
had voted to strike. This was broadcast live on the evening news 
of all three TV network affiliates. 
That weekend the mailings began. First, the families of nursing 
home residents received a plea for help from the nursing home 
workers. The county went mad, threatening to arrest whoever 
copied the mailing list. Seeing such a reaction, a second mailing 
was sent under the organizer's name telling these families that 
the county paid people to look after stray dogs in kennels twice 
as much as they paid the people who cared for their parents and 
grandparents. This time the home and office phone numbers of 
the county board chairman were included. 
The union sent out a 5,000-piece mailing to the county's ven-
dors and creditors with a very simple message: they had better 
collect any monies owed them or demand payment at time of 
service until there was a settlement. Stories floated of companies 
refusing to take county checks and businessmen coming to the 
courthouse in person to demand that the county pay their bills. 
The church mailing produced multiple commitments for churches 
and food pantries to feed and clothe strikers and their families. 
All of this made the newspapers, feeding the fire of crisis. 
Three days before the deadline the union held another rally, this 
time with community supporters. 400 people picketed the county 
board meeting, chanting furiously. Flanked by clergy and Ameri-
can flags, the marchers entered the meeting, made speeches and 
began chanting again, disrupting the county board session. The 
papers printed union pronouncements that "this would be like 
no strike this county has ever seen" and that the strike would be 
brought to the "homes, businesses and political activities of our 
enemies." These wild speeches, media images of hundreds of 
workers screaming and yelling, the community campaign and the 
mounting religious and public support all produced an atmosphere 
of genuine crisis. 
Over the following week, through marathon negotiations, the 
union finally settled without a strike, the county caving in thor-
oughly. The union's monster bargaining committee lasted to the 
very end. 
Conclusion 
Local 473's victory came from an aggressive, confrontational 
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and high profile campaign that won the imagination of the press 
and the support of the community. The workers' needs versus the 
county's greed was the topic of discussion for everyone who lived 
in Winnebago County. The pressure was too much for county offi-
cials, so they simply caved in. 
The union's organizing program put the responsibility for fight-
ing and winning a contract squarely on the workers' shoulders. 
Union staff and the resources of the state organization provided 
leadership and a plan for winning. But we made it clear that if 
workers were waiting for someone else to do it for them, they 
would win nothing. The program created a new terrain not only 
to facilitate mass involvement, but also to encourage new leader-
ship to emerge. 
The new faces that assumed the central positions in the READY 
TO FIGHT campaign are now experienced in the unionism of 
struggle, organization, discipline and participation. These indivi-
duals internalized the battle and took a deep personal responsi-
bility for doing whatever was necessary to win. By the end of this 
fight, they understood that the strength of the union is based 
wholly on the commitment that co-workers have towards each 
other, not on the ability of overworked union staff to juggle a 
thousand grievances. 
This experience shows that in a short time a disaffected and 
disorganized group can be transformed into a powerful force. The 
more difficult questions, however, lie in the future. Absent a crisis 
or a full-time organizer, how can this energy be sustained? The 
kind of resources AFSCME Illinois Council 31 provided to save 
this disintegrating local are not available on an ongoing basis. How 
can the new group of local activists institutionalize their leader-
ship while the old leaders are even more committed to maintain-
ing their positions now that the union is a dynamic and viable 
body? The "organizing model of unionism" relies on the belief 
that people should not shy away from injustice, that together with 
their co-workers they should stand up and fight. But how can 
union staff and rank-and-file leaders sustain mainstream member-
ship involvement in the daunting and exhausting task of fighting 
the myriad of injustices management imposes during the life of 
a contract? How can leaders learn to pick their fights so they don't 
exhaust themselves and deplete their members' energies? These 
questions will not be answered by cerebral reflection. Unions will 
find solutions by embracing the fight, by devoting more resources 
to internal organizing, and by encouraging the development of new 
leaders and new kinds of leadership structures. • 
